Critiquing Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Abortion Defence

Introduction

Judith Jarvis Thomson’s essay A Defense of Abortion remains one of the most influential and provocative contributions to the abortion debate. Her arguments have shaped both academic discussion and public discourse for decades, particularly through her famous “Violinist” analogy.

This essay will provide three central critiques of Thomson’s work. First, it will address the ambiguous nature of her perspective on personhood. Second, it will expose the central flaw in the Violinist analogy. Third, it will challenge her claim that parental responsibility can ultimately be a choice.

Critique 1 - Ambiguous Perspective On Personhood

Judith Jarvis Thomson is right to note that ‘most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.’[1] This is the foundational claim she rejects. Yet my first critique of her essay is that, in rejecting this premise, she offers no clear alternative for when a “fetus” becomes a person. Although she concedes ‘that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth,’[2] she never specifies exactly when this occurs, leaving her argument vague and incomplete.

To justify her denial of personhood from conception, Thomson appeals to an analogy, ‘a newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree.’[3] However, this comparison fails to capture an essential truth of embryology. She presents the acorn as if it was an entirely different entity from an oak – it is not. Whilst an acorn is the earliest stage of development of an oak tree, they are both the same entity and organism. In the same way, a fertilized ovum is the initial stage of human development. Both the acorn and the embryo are the same entity yet at different points of maturity. Both biblically and scientifically there is evidence to support this claim.  

The key point here is that at no stage in the womb does the embryo undergo a change of nature. While the embryo may lack certain developmental features,  just as an infant lacks those of a teenager, or a teenager those of an adult, its essence remains constant: it is a human being. Development changes size, form, and ability, but not humanity itself.

From an anti-abortion perspective, Thomson’s ambiguity is deeply problematic. If the recognition of personhood rests on an undefined point, as Thomson suggests, somewhere ‘well before birth,’[4] then personhood becomes subject to arbitrary and subjective determination. This is precisely why acknowledging personhood from conception is not only theologically and philosophically coherent, but also ethically essential for safeguarding the most vulnerable members of the human family.

Critique 2 - The Flaws in the Violinist Analogy 

In this essay, Thomson also introduces her renowned “Violinist” analogy. She uses this analogy to suggest that even if we grant personhood from conception, it does not follow that abortion is impermissible. Her analogy is as follows:

‘You wake up in the morning and find yourself back-to-back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, 'Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.'[5]

She then asks the question, ‘is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?’[6] She states, what if a doctor says to you, ‘but you’ve now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.’[7] The reason, from the Doctor, according to Thomson’s analogy is ‘all persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons.’[8] She adds, ‘granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him.’[9]

She then concludes, based on this analogy, ‘I imagine you would regard this as outrageous.’[10] For this reason, Thomson states, ‘something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument [anti-abortion] I mentioned a moment ago.’[11]

Thomson’s analogy of the violinist becomes central to her critiques of pro-life arguments against abortion. The central flaw in this analogy, from my perspective, is that it fundamentally misrepresents the reality of pregnancy, particularly when it comes to the principle of consent. It frames the woman primarily as a victim rather than acknowledging her as a mother. This false framing removes the element of personal responsibility from the parents. This distortion fails to capture the actual nature of how pregnancy occurs. For a pregnancy to take place, both the woman and the father are active participants who bear primary responsibility, they are not passive recipients of an imposed situation. In this sense, they are not victims of the process - they are its agents. Moreover, once a child is conceived, the parents hold an ongoing responsibility to care for and protect that child. Therefore, the metaphor not only oversimplifies but significantly distorts the moral and practical realities of pregnancy.

Critique 3 - Parental Responsibility Is Always Obliged Never Assumed?

Thomson anticipates a potential critique of her argument, noting, ‘and it might be argued that all my analogies are therefore irrelevant - for you do not have that special kind of responsibility for that violinist.’[12] Her response is to summarise her position succinctly: ‘surely we do not have any such ‘special responsibility’ for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly.’[13] To clarify this point, she provides an illustration:

‘If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it.’[14]

By contrast, she argues:

‘But if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it. They may wish to assume responsibility for it, or they may not wish to. And I am suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would require large sacrifices, then they may refuse.’[15]

In summary, Thomson maintains that parental responsibility is not inherently biological but is instead established through the voluntary assumption of care. Yet here lies the crucial flaw in her reasoning. By separating sex from its procreative nature and reducing it to a purely recreational act, Thomson overlooks an undeniable reality: every sexual act carries the potential for a child, and with that potential comes intrinsic parental responsibility. No child has ever been born apart from parents who bear this responsibility, even if they later deny or reject it.

Society itself recognises this principle through legal mechanisms such as child support, which enforce parental duty. The tragic inconsistency is that while courts uphold responsibility for born children, they simultaneously allow parents to reject responsibility for the unborn, even to the point of sanctioning their destruction. This loophole exposes a grave injustice - one that distorts the very meaning of responsibility and undermines the equal dignity of every human life.

Conclusion

Judith Jarvis Thomson’s A Defense of Abortion remains at the forefront of serious thinking around the issue of abortion. Yet, as this essay seeks to demonstrate, her reasoning ultimately falls short. Her perspective on personhood remains ambiguous, leaving her central claims without a stable foundation. Her famous “Violinist” analogy, while rhetorically intriguing, fails to capture the unique moral context of pregnancy and the responsibilities inherent in bringing new life into existence. Finally, her attempt to reduce parental responsibility to a matter of voluntary choice neglects the natural and unavoidable obligations that arise from the act of procreation itself.

Taken together, these three critiques highlight the fragility of Thomson’s defense. If every human life possesses inherent worth from conception, then the duty to protect the most vulnerable among us cannot be dismissed as optional or negotiable. Far from weakening the anti-abortion position, Thomson’s essay ultimately reinforces why the defence of unborn life remains one of the most urgent ethical tasks of our age.

Bibliography

Jarvis Thomson, Judith. “A Defense of Abortion.”  Philosophy & Public Affairs, Autumn, 1971, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971): 47-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2265091.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Af619cf1d53bbae6f3d708339cdfb28b4&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

Endnotes

[1] Jarvis Thomson, Judith. “A Defense of Abortion.”  Philosophy & Public Affairs, Autumn, 1971, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971): 47-66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2265091.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Af619cf1d53bbae6f3d708339cdfb28b4&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1. 47.

[2] Jarvis Thomson, “Defense”. 47.

[3] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 48.

[4] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 47.

[5] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 48-49.

[6] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[7] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[8] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[9] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[10] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[11] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 49.

[12] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 65.

[13] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 65.

[14] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 65.

[15] Jarvis Thomson. “Defense”. 66.